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Abstract 
Brexit means that regions of the United Kingdom will lose access to the EU Cohesion Policy. Have 
EU funds been effective, and what might be the consequences of an interruption of EU financial 
support? This paper studies the impact of ‘Objective 1’ funding – the highest form of EU aid – in 
Cornwall and South Yorkshire, two of the UK’s most subsidised regions. Counterfactual 
methodologies assessing their labour market and economic performance provide evidence of a 
positive effect of EU Objective 1 funds. When in 2006 South Yorkshire lost Objective 1 eligibility, 
this massively reduced its share of EU funds and the region was unable to sustain the gains obtained 
in previous years. This suggests that while Structural Funds may be effectively improving socio-
economic conditions of poorer regions, the performance of subsidised areas could be deeply 
affected by a reduction (or worse, an interruption) of EU aid.  
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1. Introduction 
 
In June 2016, the United Kingdom voted to leave the European Union. ‘Brexit’ received 
high support from some of the UK regions that have been among the largest beneficiaries of EU 
Structural Funds. This reflects discontent with the EU and the way in which EU financial resources 
have been spent, and would seem to imply that EU Cohesion Policy has not succeeded in triggering 
greater development in these regions. But has this been the case? When (and if) the UK leaves the 
EU, these areas will no longer be eligible to receive EU funds, and the shift from a status of high 
subsidisation to one in which no more European funds are available may bring about a number of 
unexpected consequences. Might the loss of EU funding have any adverse impacts on future 
employment levels and economic performance of currently subsidised regions?    
In order to answer these questions, this study looks at two UK regions, Cornwall and South 
Yorkshire, which voted to leave the EU in the referendum on Brexit
1
 despite being among the 
highest recipients of EU funds in the country. Cornwall has been and continues to be eligible for 
‘Objective 1’ funding, the most significant form of EU financial help. The region was first 
classified as Objective 1 in 2000 and has continued to receive funding since then. Therefore, the 
flow of EU funds will be interrupted if and when the UK leaves the European Union. Conversely, 
South Yorkshire was heavily supported in the past but lost its eligibility for this stream of funding 
in 2006. The particular evolution of this region’s eligibility status allows us to investigate how the 
loss of Objective 1 funding affected its economy, gleaning relevant lessons on the potential impact a 
similar loss could have in Cornwall and in other highly funded regions. 
In this paper, we study the effects of EU Objective 1 funds in these two regions using 
counterfactual methods. Our contribution to the literature is twofold. First, we provide evidence on 
the causal impacts of Objective 1 programmes and illustrate how the policy effects evolve over 
time; second, following an increasingly common approach in place-based policy evaluations (see 
Neumark and Simpson, 2015), we analyse the impact of policy interventions taking into account 
both the period in which the implementation takes place and the period following the programme’s 
completion. By looking at the performance of regions after Objective 1 eligibility is lost, our 
analysis examines the persistency of the policy’s impacts and investigates its capacity to produce 
self-sustaining regional development paths. The few works evaluating the impact of EU Cohesion 
                                                          
1
 56% of Cornwall’s and 61% of South Yorkshire’s voting population favoured leaving the European Union in the 
referendum on Brexit, held on 23
rd
 June 2016.  
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Policy with counterfactual techniques have documented the potential for Objective 1 transfers to 
foster growth, spur investments, and generate jobs (Becker et al., 2010; 2013; Pellegrini et al., 2013; 
Giua, 2016). Only very recently, has scholarly research begun to examine the post-policy impacts of 
Objective 1 funds (Barone et al., 2016). However, no study has ever investigated the effects of these 
policies by considering their full cycle, i.e. from the moment in which a region is awarded the 
Objective 1 status to the period following the loss of Objective 1 funds.  
We compare the trajectory of Cornwall and South Yorkshire with the one of ‘synthetic’ 
control regions, created as the combination of English regions ineligible for Objective 1 funds. Our 
findings provide clear evidence of a significant reduction in unemployment in Cornwall, relative to 
the synthetic control, during the period in which it was classified as Objective 1. South Yorkshire 
also displays a significant decrease in unemployment between 2000 and 2006, but the 
improvements are gradually offset during the following years. The empirical estimates suggest that 
after Objective 1 status is lost, South Yorkshire evolves towards the trend of a similar untreated 
region, indicating that Objective 1 funds produced very little permanent/structural effects overall. 
Difference-in-differences models of local unemployment growth estimated at the level of wards 
confirm this evidence. In addition, Cornwall appears to be closing the gap in GDP per capita 
relative to untreated regions during the Objective 1 period, while South Yorkshire’s economic 
catch-up process loses pace and begins to revert when Objective 1 funds are no longer available. 
Overall, the results indicate that Cohesion Policy has had a positive impact on the creation 
of jobs and the promotion of economic growth in poorer UK regions. However, these outcomes 
may not be persistent, and may quickly disappear after the end of the high-intensity funding period, 
even in the presence of transitional programmes that make the reduction of EU funds more gradual. 
Hence, the sudden interruption of Structural Funds to poorer regions that would result from Brexit 
could have relevant medium-run consequences on the economy and labour market of areas 
currently receiving the highest proportions of EU funds. 
The paper is organised as follows. Section II introduces the background of the Objective 1 
programme and reviews the literature on EU Cohesion Policy evaluations; Section III presents the 
quasi-experimental design; Section IV discusses the data and descriptive statistics; Section V 
presents the empirical results, beginning with the study performed at the regional level using the 
synthetic control method, and followed by the difference-in-differences model estimated at the level 
of wards; Section VI relates the empirical results to the investment strategies of the two analysed 
regions; Section VII concludes by summarising the results and defining some paths for future 
research. 
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2. Institutional background and overview of the literature 
 
Objective 1 Programme 
 The European Cohesion Policy was established in 1988 as a set of regional investment 
programmes aiming to promote social and economic cohesion in the EU. Starting from the 1994-
1999 EU investment period, Cohesion Policy expenditures represent approximately one third of the 
EU’s total budget. Periodic variations have changed the way in which regions are classified for 
Cohesion Policy purposes. At the beginning of every new programming period, the European 
Commission revises the regional allocation of funds and the list of regions considered ‘in most need 
of support’. The eligibility rule for determining Objective 1 status – i.e. “Regions whose 
development is lagging behind” (European Commission, 2008a) – has always remained the same2. 
Objective 1 regions, receiving the large majority of Structural Funds
3
, are those whose average 
GDP per head is below 75 percent of the EU average for the last three years of available data before 
the start of a new programming period (Gripaios and Bishop, 2006).  
Under the Objective 1 programme, regions are entitled to be financed through the European 
Regional Development Fund (ERDF), the European Social Fund (ESF), the European Agricultural 
Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD), and the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund (EMFF)
4
. 
Among these, the most important sources of funding are the ERDF and the ESF. While the 
development goals to be achieved in each Objective 1 region vary according to specific regional 
plans, there exist a number of broad themes on which the ERDF and the ESF focus. Generally, the 
former fund is used for developing new infrastructure, fostering the competitiveness of SMEs, and 
promoting technological development and innovation, while the latter aims to improve employment 
opportunities, equip the workforce with better skills and better job prospects, and help unemployed 
and inactive people enter work (European Commission, 2008a).  
                                                          
2
 The name ‘Objective 1’ regions was changed into ‘Convergence regions’ for the 2007-2013 period and again into ‘Less 
developed regions’ for 2014-2020, but the rule of eligibility has not been modified. 
3
 Objective 1 regions received 71.6% of the total 2000-2006 Cohesion Policy budget (€213bn), despite representing only 
37% of the total EU population (European Commission, 2010). For the 2007-2013 period the proportion of funds to 
‘Convergence regions’ was increased to 82% (European Commission, 2008b).  
4
 A fifth source of funding is the Cohesion Fund, available to Objective 1 regions of Member States with a Gross National 
Income below 90% of the EU average. This rule has made UK regions not eligible to receive these grants. 
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The share of available financial resources is established before the beginning of each 7-year 
programming period by the European Commission on the basis of development plans jointly 
defined with the regions’ managing authorities. Every managing authority is in charge of providing 
information on the programmes, advertising and selecting projects, and monitoring their 
implementation. Depending on the type of project, the beneficiaries of the funds can be local 
Governments, education institutions, other public entities, enterprises, non-governmental 
organisations, or private citizens. 
 Regions classified as Objective 1 are expected to implement development programmes 
which would allow them to converge to higher levels of income and eventually lose their status of 
areas in highest need of support. As a consequence, the proportion of EU subsidies to these regions 
would progressively diminish. As the per capita GDP of Objective 1 regions becomes higher than 
75 percent of the EU average, ‘Phasing-in’ or ‘Phasing-out’ transitional programmes are put in 
place, reducing the amount of funds available to former Objective 1 regions. 
 
Literature  
The effectiveness of Cohesion Policy has been assessed in a vast number of evaluations 
performed with many different empirical methodologies. The majority of studies draw on samples 
of EU NUTS2 regions and employ cross-sectional or panel data (Cappelen et al., 2003; Ederveen et 
al., 2003; Rodríguez-Pose and Fratesi, 2004; Beugelsdijk and Eijffinger, 2005; Ederveen et al., 
2006; Puigcerver-Peñalver, 2007; Esposti and Bussoletti, 2008). More recent works have attempted 
to address endogeneity issues by using instrumental variable models in combination with spatial 
econometric techniques (Dall’erba and Le Gallo, 2008; Ramajo et al., 2008; Mohl and Hagen, 2010; 
Bouayad-Agha et al., 2013). In spite of the large number of studies produced, this literature has not 
reached a consensus on whether Structural Fund spending is beneficial (Cappelen et al., 2003; Bahr, 
2008; Esposti and Bussoletti, 2008; Becker et al., 2012), beneficial under certain conditions 
(Rodríguez-Pose and Fratesi, 2004; Mohl and Hagen, 2010; Becker et al., 2013; Bouayad-Agha et 
al., 2013; Rodriguez-Pose and Garcilazo, 2015; Crescenzi and Giua, 2016), insignificant (Garcia-
Milá and McGuire, 2001; Dall’erba and Le Gallo, 2008) or even detrimental and unjustified 
(Boldrin and Canova, 2001; Dall’erba et al., 2009). 
 7 
 
In order to provide more conclusive evidence on the effect of EU funds in European regions, 
a new strand of the literature has proposed novel estimation methodologies based on quasi-
experiments and counterfactual comparisons. 
A commonly used counterfactual approach evaluating EU Cohesion Policy exploits the 
eligibility rule for Objective 1 status as a threshold for a regression discontinuity design (RDD). 
Areas classified as Objective 1 (treated) are compared to similar areas with a GDP just above the 75 
percent of the EU average. Becker et al. (2010; 2013) and Pellegrini et al. (2013) use this 
methodology and find a positive and significant effect of Structural Funds on economic growth in 
Objective 1 regions, while Accetturo et al. (2014) uncover a negative impact of the funds on the 
degree of trust and cooperation among citizens. Gagliardi and Percoco (2016) demonstrate that the 
positive effect of EU funds on growth is stronger in rural areas close to urban agglomerates. 
Adopting a spatial RDD methodology that compares areas across the boundaries of Objective 1 
regions, Giua (2016) provides evidence on the beneficial and causal effect of Cohesion Policy in the 
municipalities of Italian Objective 1 regions. In these studies, the effects of EU funds are assessed 
in a static framework, which does not allow for a change over time in the eligibility status of the 
regions. Whether a region is affected by reductions in the flow of funds deriving from the loss of 
Objective 1 status is a question that has been investigated by Barone et al. (2016), finding that the 
growth rate of Abruzzo (Italy) has significantly reduced in the period following the change in 
Objective 1 eligibility. 
Increasingly, place-based policy interventions are evaluated across their full cycle, 
considering both treatment and post-treatment outcomes (e.g. Kline and Moretti, 2014; Einio and 
Overman, 2016). Yet, no study has ever looked at the impact of the EU Objective 1 programme 
from the moment in which eligibility is obtained by a region to the moment in which it is lost and 
beyond. 
We do so in this paper, by testing the long-term effect of Cohesion Policy on unemployment 
and economic growth. The effectiveness of Cohesion strategies has already been evaluated in the 
literature by using labour market outcomes (Garcia-Milá and McGuire, 2001; Becker et al., 2010; 
Giua, 2016); economic growth is the most commonly used indicator to measure the success of EU 
development policies (e.g. Becker et al., 2010; 2013). 
In addition, this paper contributes to the literature assessing the impact of place-based policy 
initiatives in the UK While extensive research has been carried out to evaluate the effects of place-
based policies promoted by the UK Government (e.g. Harris and Robinson, 2004; Devereux et al., 
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2007; Wren and Jones, 2011; Criscuolo et al., 2012; Faggio, 2015; Einio and Overman, 2016), very 
little evidence exists on the impact of European regional policies in the UK context. An exception is 
the study by Criscuolo et al. (2016), investigating the role of firm subsidies granted by the British 
Government for stimulating employment in poorer regions, and finding a positive correlation 
between Objective 1 eligibility and changes in firms’ employment. 
 The scarcity of research on the effects of Cohesion Policy in the UK is surprising, 
considering that the country’s significant regional disparities (McCann, 2016) made it one of the 
highest recipients of EU funds for a long time
5
. 
 
3. Cornwall and South Yorkshire as natural policy experiments  
 
A peculiarity of the UK context is the way in which the geography of regions targeted by 
EU Cohesion Policy has evolved over time. As shown in Figure 1, during the 1994-1999 period the 
UK Objective 1 regions were Merseyside in England, the Highlands and Islands of Scotland and 
Northern Ireland. For the 2000-2006 programming period the list of ‘lagging behind regions’ was 
radically modified. Of the aforementioned regions, only Merseyside retained Objective 1 support 
while three new regions were declared eligible: Cornwall and South Yorkshire in England, and 
West Wales and The Valleys in Wales. From 2007 Merseyside and South Yorkshire were no longer 
considered Objective 1, while Cornwall and West Wales conserved the status for the 2007-2013 and 
the 2014-2020 periods (Figure 1).  
Table A1 in the Appendix summarises the amount of EU funds per inhabitant
6
 in 1994-
1999, 2000-2006, and 2007-2013 obtained by English regions. It can be noted that all regions 
received some form of financial support, but the amount of funds awarded to those not eligible for 
Objective 1 is far lower than what was obtained by those considered in highest need of help
7
. 
                                                          
5
 As an example, during the 2000-2006 period the UK received approximately €17 billion. Only Spain, Italy, Germany and 
Greece received more EU Funds during the same years. 
6
 These figures are based on ‘payments’ from the European Commission. Payments refer to the resources paid by the 
European Commission to EU regions and are available to be spent. Although they do not reflect the exact final spending 
of regions, they represent more accurate estimates of actual spending than European Commission’s ‘commitments’, 
often used by Cohesion Policy evaluations as proxies for funds’ expenditures. 
7
 During 1994-1999, the territory of Cornwall was classified as Objective 5b, i.e. ‘Adapt agricultural structures and 
promote the development of rural areas’, while South Yorkshire was classified as Objective 2, i.e. ‘Reconvert region 
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Given the strict and specific criterion adopted to assign the Objective 1 status, variations in 
eligibility like the ones experienced by Cornwall and South Yorkshire in 2000 represent almost 
unique cases in the history of Cohesion Policy. As Objective 1 regions are expected to use 
Structural Funds to improve their economies and converge to the average level of per capita income 
of the EU, it is very unusual for regions to switch to Objective 1 in countries that have been part of 
the EU for a long time. 
 
Figure 1: Objective 1 eligibility in the UK by EU programming period 
1994-1999 2000-2006 2007-2013 2014-2020 
 
 
 
 
 
In the following paragraphs, we analyse the historical reasons that have brought Cornwall 
and South Yorkshire to be classified as Objective 1, and the evolution of their Cohesion Policy 
status from that moment until today. 
 
Cornwall 
Figure 2 plots the evolution of per capita GDP purchasing power standard, comparing the 
trends in Cornwall and South Yorkshire with the average of the EU as of 1999 (with 15 Member 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
affected by declining industry’. The fact that the two regions were among the top receivers of Structural Funds in England 
before 2000 is accounted for in the empirical analysis. 
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States).  Between 1995 and 1999, Cornwall was growing at a slightly lower pace with respect to the 
EU15 – the 1995-1999 average growth rate of Cornwall was 4.5 percent, while in the EU15 it was 
4.8 percent. On average, however, the growth rate of the region is comparable to that of the EU, as 
Cornwall’s GDP per capita was €9,900 in 1995, equal to 58.2 percent of the EU15, and €11,800 in 
1999, corresponding to 57.6 percent of the EU15. 
 
Figure 2: GDP PPS per inhabitant (EUR) 
 
Source: OECD. 
 
Despite the fact that Cornwall’s GDP per capita was well below the 75 percent threshold in 
the 90s, the European Commission only entitled Cornwall to receive Objective 1 funding from the 
programming period which started in 2000. The reason for this is that until 1998 Cornwall and its 
neighbour Devon were incorporated into a single statistical area with a GDP per capita above 75 
percent of the EU. In 1998 the UK Government introduced a reform revising NUTS regional 
borders, splitting the Cornwall-Devon region into two separate statistical areas. Previously, under 
the ‘Devonwall’ political concept promoted by the UK Conservative Party from the 1970s, 
Cornwall and Devon had been linked together in an economic, political and statistical sense.  
After the 1997 UK general elections and the Conservatives’ defeat, the Liberal Democrats 
withdrew their support to the ‘Devonwall’ project, opening the doors to the statistical separation of 
the two regions and the possibility for Cornwall to be awarded Objective 1 status. Despite the 
existence of a political campaign for Cornwall’s separation from Devon, the change in regional 
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borders and in EU funds eligibility was hardly predictable (Willett, 2013). The requests for 
separation were complicated by the presence of political elites and stakeholders in Cornwall 
believing that the unity between Devon and Cornwall was best serving their interests, due to the 
possibility of having a stronger ‘lobbying voice’ by staying together (Stanyer, 1997). In addition, 
the Labour party, which won the 1997 national elections was not particularly keen on devolving 
political autonomy to territories it did not control politically
8
 (Willet and Giovannini, 2014).   
Importantly, the reasons behind the attainment of the Objective 1 status in Cornwall are 
independent from any circumstance directly affecting the long-term economic trajectory of the 
region. The 1998 reform justified the division of Devon and Cornwall on the basis of “the very 
different economic conditions of the two counties, and Cornwall’s sparsity of population, 
geographical peripherality and distinct cultural and historic factors reflecting a Celtic background” 
(House of Commons, 1998). The economic differences between Cornwall and Devon emphasised 
by the UK Government are evident if the levels of per capita GDP of the two regions are 
compared
9
. However, when looking at other measures of economic prosperity such as the Total 
Household Income or the Gross Disposable Household Income
10
, the figures for 1997-1999 appear 
very similar for the two regions and in both cases above the 75 percent EU threshold (Gripaios and 
McVittie, 2003). This suggests that Cornwall was “somewhat fortunate to be awarded Objective 1 
status” (Gripaios and McVittie, 2003: 372), as the principal reason for the region’s qualification for 
financial support was the way borders have been re-drawn (Gripaios and McVittie, 2003; Gripaios 
and Bishop, 2006). 
Therefore, the sudden increase in EU grants can be considered exogenous to the pre-
treatment economic trend of the region, making it possible to identify the effect of EU-financed 
programmes by looking at the evolution of the regional labour market before and after the 
attainment of the Objective 1 status. The Objective 1 status of Cornwall was confirmed in 2006 for 
                                                          
8
 In the 1997 elections the Labour party obtained the relative majority of votes only in one of five Cornish constituencies 
(the other four were won by the Liberal Democrats), while in the 1992 elections the Labour was the third party after 
Conservatives and Liberal Democrats. The 1998 reform was promoted by the Labour-led central government. Given the 
historical political weakness of the Labour in Cornwall, the Devon-Cornwall 1998 separation was not easily foreseeable, 
due to the fact that it would have meant a political victory for an opposition party, the Lib Dem, which had begun to back 
the separatists’ requests. The separation has been the result of lobbying activities which eventually led the national 
government to include the Cornwall-Devon division in the reform (Willet, 2013). 
9
 In 1999, the per capita GDP of Cornwall was €11,800, while Devon’s was around €15,900. 
10
 Total Household Income (THI) is calculated as all income received by household residents in a region, while Gross 
Disposable Household Income deducts from THI expenditures on taxes, social security, pension contributions and 
interest payments. 
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the 2007-2013 period, and again in 2013 for the 2014-2020 period (Figure 1). This makes Cornwall 
the region that received the largest proportions of EU funds per capita in England from 2000 
onwards.  
 
South Yorkshire  
With respect to Cornwall, the attainment of Objective 1 eligibility in South Yorkshire 
occurred in a ‘less unexpected’ way. Formerly specialised in manufacturing, South Yorkshire has 
gone through a period of deindustrialisation which brought about the closure of most coal mines in 
the early 1990s. The region’s economic decline was seriously addressed by the central Government 
only from 1997 onwards, when the newly-elected Labour Government promoted interventions 
tackling the growing unemployment by matching national resources with the EU funds (Kirk et al., 
2012). From 1994 to 1999, the South Yorkshire territory was classified as Objective 2. The 
proportion of EU funds available to the region increased massively from 2000, when South 
Yorkshire became eligible for Objective 1 support.  
Unlike the case of Cornwall, there has been no border re-definition behind South 
Yorkshire’s change of status. Hence, anticipation effects and externalities may affect our estimates 
if we assume that people and businesses react to the change in eligibility before this has actually 
occurred. However, the fact that South Yorkshire’s per capita GDP was swinging above and below 
the 75 percent threshold just before 2000 – it was 74.2 percent of the EU15 in 1997 and 76 percent 
in 1998
11
 – made it more difficult to predict a future Objective 1 eligibility, and therefore behave in 
such a way that could anticipate the inflow of EU funds to the region. 
Moreover, the per capita GDP trend of the region has been almost parallel to the one of the 
EU15 in the years preceding the eligibility change (Figure 2). South Yorkshire’s growth rate during 
the 1995-1999 period was 5.9 percent, slightly above the EU15’s 4.8 percent. The region continued 
to catch up with the EU average during 2000-2006 period and due to this increase in income and to 
the Eastern Enlargement – an exogenous event which made the 75 percent threshold easier to be 
                                                          
11
 The region was entitled to receive Objective 1 funds despite the fact that its GDP was above 75% of EU average in 
1998 because the EU considers the average GDP of the three years of available data before the beginning of the period 
to classify the regions. Final data for 1998 was presumably not yet available in 1999, when the final decision over 
eligibility was made. 
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exceeded– during the 2007-2013 period South Yorkshire lost the status of Objective 1 becoming a 
Phasing-in region.  
The Phasing-in status entitled South Yorkshire to receive ‘transitional funding’, that is, more 
resources than any other non-Objective 1 region but less than Cornwall, the only English Objective 
1 region during the programming period starting in 2007 (Table A1). This status was confirmed in 
2013, when South Yorkshire was defined as a ‘Transition region’ for the 2014-2020 period, i.e. 
with an average GDP per capita between 75 percent and 90 percent of the EU average. This gives 
South Yorkshire the possibility to obtain more funds than ‘more developed regions’ (GDP per 
capita above 90 percent of the EU average), but less than ‘less developed regions’ (former 
Objective 1). 
 
Potentially confounding policies 
The main policy for employment promotion in Cornwall and South Yorkshire besides EU 
Cohesion Policy was the Regional Selective Assistance (RSA) programme (renamed in 2008 as 
Grant for Business Investment (GBI)), financed by the UK national Government and intended to 
create and safeguard employment in the poorest areas of the country (Criscuolo et al., 2012). The 
RSA schemes are no longer in force in England since 2014. 
Through this policy, the Government provided grants to manufacturing firms located in UK 
areas characterised by low GDP per capita and high unemployment. Changes in eligibility for RSA 
occurred in coincidence with the start of new EU programming periods. We attempt to minimise the 
potentially confounding effect of this policy in the empirical analysis, by exploiting variations over 
time in the geography of RSA support schemes. 
 
4. Data and descriptives 
 
The main outcome variable used to evaluate the effectiveness of Objective 1 funding in 
Cornwall and South Yorkshire is unemployment, proxied by the share of people claiming Job-
Seeker’s Allowance (JSA) unemployment benefits12. Data are obtained from the Office for National 
                                                          
12
 Job-Seeker Allowance unemployment benefit is paid by the UK national government to unemployed people who are 
actively seeking work. All citizens of England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland are equally entitled to apply for JSA.  
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Statistics (ONS) Nomis database and are available from the year 1992. Although the share of 
unemployment benefit claimants is not an official measure of unemployment, it is a less noisy 
indicator than the unemployment rate
13
 and the only one available for areas smaller than UK Local 
Authorities. As shown in Appendix A2, during the period in which Cornwall and South Yorkshire 
have received Objective 1 funds, the rate of UK unemployment benefit claimants and the 
unemployment rate display similar trajectories.  
A second outcome variable used in the analysis is per capita GDP, available only at the 
regional level from 1995 onwards. Information on this variable is obtained from OECD statistics.  
Figure 3 describes the level and growth of unemployment and per capita GDP of English 
NUTS2 regions during the analysed period. The upper quadrants of the Figure show the percentage 
of unemployment benefit claimants and the level of income before 2000. Cornwall and South 
Yorkshire were among the regions with the highest percentage of unemployed people, and among 
the poorest regions in the country. The bottom quadrants of Figure 3 suggest that during the 2000-
2013 period Cornwall has been one of the top performing regions in England both in terms of 
unemployment reduction – a decrease by over 3 percent – and in terms of economic growth – an 
increase by over 2.8 percent. Conversely, South Yorkshire’s variation of unemployment and per 
capita GDP during the same period has been similar to that of most English regions. South 
Yorkshire experienced one of the largest unemployment reductions and fastest GDP pc growth 
during the 2000-2006 period; however, the following years have been characterised by growing 
unemployment – over 9 percent increase – and an economic recession – over 1.2 percent reduction 
in GDP per capita.   
These trends are analysed more thoroughly in the empirical analysis. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
13
 The JSA claimant count is often used as a proxy for unemployment. Due to sampling variability, the estimates of 
unemployment produced by the Labour Force Survey (LFS) are highly volatile. For this reason, JSA benefit claimant 
count is a less distorted and more reliable indicator than the unemployment rate, particularly when focusing on subsets of 
the UK population and on small administrative areas (ONS, 2013). 
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Figure 3: Unemployment and GDP per capita levels and growth, English regions 
  
  
Source: own elaboration with Nomis and OECD data. 
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The counterfactual study adopts two different spatial dimensions: regions and wards. 
 
Regions 
The analysis performed at the regional level exploits two main sources of data. The first is 
Eurostat Regio, providing data from 1995 until 2014; the second is the Quarterly Labour Force 
Survey Local Area Data (LFS LAD), containing information on employment, economic activity and 
related subjects at the level of UK Local Authority Districts from 1992 to 2006. The period is 
collapsed from quarterly to yearly. The final dataset is composed of LFS variables from 1992 to 
2006, Eurostat and OECD variables from 1995 to 2014 and the unemployment proxy available from 
1992 to 2014.  
NUTS2 regions are characterised by an average population of 1.7 million inhabitants, of 
which 2.8 percent claiming unemployment benefits (2000-2014 average). 
  
Wards 
The lowest level of aggregation used in this study is the one of electoral wards. Ward-level 
units allow to capture localised unemployment clusters, because most ward boundaries have been 
used by the ONS in 2001 to draw Output Areas (for which data are not available), a geographical 
classification of socially homogeneous areas in terms of household tenure and population size. The 
wards of England have an average population of around 5000 inhabitants (with high variance across 
wards, see descriptive table in Appendix A3).  
Due to the 1996 revision of frozen ward boundaries, the unemployment variable is only 
available for wards from 1996. Data on other variables at ward level are obtained from the 1991 UK 
Census. The following Censuses cannot be used because they relate to different ward 
classifications. The variable for wards’ residents is given by the number of 1991 residents 
interpolated between 1996 and 2014 by assigning the average population growth rate of the region 
to its constituent wards.  
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5. Results 
Synthetic control method – effect on unemployment 
In order to compare the unemployment trend of the treated regions with appropriate 
counterfactuals, we adopt the synthetic control method for comparative case studies developed by 
Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) and Abadie et al. (2010; 2015). This method allows to assess the 
effect of policy interventions taking place at an aggregate level, using data for geographical units 
not exposed to the treatment but comparable to the treated region (see the online Annex for a more 
detailed explanation of this methodology). The synthetic control regions are constructed on the 
basis of a number of labour market indicators related to the typology of the labour force, the 
sectorial composition and the level of education and training. In addition, we control for the level of 
GDP per capita
14
. We also account for the fact that Cornwall and South Yorkshire were receiving 
EU funds during 1994-1999 by controlling for the amount of Structural Funds obtained in the pre-
treatment period. 
Table A4 in the Appendix summarises pre-treatment average values of all variables used to 
construct the synthetic regions, comparing them to the averages for Cornwall, South Yorkshire and 
England. Table A5 presents the list of weights on which the synthetic regions are created. In the 
case of Cornwall, Devon provides almost 60 percent of the weights, not surprisingly given the 
strong connection with the Cornish economy as discussed above. The remaining weights are from 
regions being among the highest recipients of Structural Funds during 1994-1999. In the case of 
South Yorkshire, the main weights come from Tees Valley and East Yorkshire, which were also 
obtaining high shares of EU funds before 2000. In both cases, the synthetic regions have an average 
value of per capita Structural Funds in the pre-treatment period that is above the English average 
and close to the figure of the two treated regions. 
Figure 4 plots the unemployment trend for Cornwall and South Yorkshire with the estimated 
trend of the respective synthetic regions between 1992 and 2014. The pre-treatment indicators 
predict well the evolution of unemployment trajectories of the treated regions until 1999, suggesting 
that treatment and control regions are running in parallel before the start of the treatment.  
                                                          
14
 By construction, Cornwall and South Yorkshire are the regions with the lowest per capita GDP among all regions in the 
sample (Merseyside is excluded), making it impossible for the synthetic region to perfectly match the treated region on 
this characteristic. Nonetheless, including this control is important in order to minimise convergence effects not being 
determined by Structural Funds support. 
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Figure 4: Unemployment trends, treated vs. synthetic regions 
 
Panel A: Cornwall Panel B: South Yorkshire 
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Panel A of Figure 4 reports the evolution of unemployment in Cornwall and its synthetic 
counterpart. From 2000 onwards a gap is clearly visible, indicating that Cornwall reduced its 
unemployment more than the synthetic control during the 2000-2006 and the 2007-2013 
programming periods. South Yorkshire and synthetic control are displayed in panel B of Figure 4. 
In this case, the two unemployment trends diverge marginally in 1999. Nevertheless, the largest gap 
between the two lines is visible during the period in which South Yorkshire was entitled to receive 
Objective 1 funds, i.e. 2000-2006. South Yorkshire’s lower line suggests that the region has reduced 
the proportion of unemployed people more than a region similar in all other relevant characteristics 
except for not having received Objective 1 aid. South Yorkshire’s gap with the synthetic region 
tends to reduce over time. From the year 2008, treated and control regions report increasingly 
similar levels of unemployment, up to the point that the two lines overlap again in 2013-2014. This 
suggests that when South Yorkshire was classified as Phasing-in, unemployment has grown faster 
than in the synthetic region, completely offsetting all labour market improvements of the previous 
seven years. 
In order to test for the significance of the estimated effects we follow Abadie et al. (2010) 
and run a series of placebo studies by iteratively applying the synthetic control method to every 
other untreated English region. Cornwall and South Yorkshire are shifted among the control units 
and the treatment is reassigned to each one of the regions in the sample. The computed gap between 
the two trends for all iterations is then compared to the one estimated for the two treatment regions. 
The results of the placebo test are displayed in Figure 5. 
Panel A provides clear evidence of a significant effect for Cornwall. No other region in the 
sample has witnessed a reduction in unemployment as large as the one experienced by Cornwall. A 
difference in the gap between Cornwall and every other English region is visible from 2002 and 
increases over time, until it stabilises in 2009. This suggests that throughout the Objective 1 period 
Cornwall has reduced the proportion of unemployment benefit claimants more than regions not 
eligible for Objective 1 grants. The difference between Cornwall’s and the synthetic region’s 
unemployment changes is equal to 0.93 percentage points
15
, corresponding to a percentage of 
unemployment benefit claimants approximately 30 percent lower than the control region.  
 
 
                                                          
15
 This has been calculated as: (U Cornwall 2013 – U Cornwall 1999) – (U synthetic 2013 – U synthetic 1999) = (1.74 - 2.88) - (2.69 - 2.89) = 
-0.93. 
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Figure 5: Unemployment gap in treated regions and placebo gaps 
Panel A: Cornwall Panel B: South Yorkshire 
   
Note: the black bold line in Panel A represents the gap between Cornwall and the synthetic region; the black bold line in 
Panel B represents the gap between South Yorkshire and the synthetic region; grey lines are placebo gaps. 
 
Panel B of Figure 5 tests the significance of the estimated gap for South Yorkshire. Between 
2001 and 2005, South Yorkshire’s proportion of unemployment benefit claimants was lower than 
any other English region not eligible for Objective 1 policies, indicating a statistically significant 
difference between treatment and control during the period. However, during the following years 
the gap becomes progressively closer to zero. This means that South Yorkshire was capable of 
reducing unemployment more than regions not in receipt of Objective 1 funds, but only temporarily. 
In the long-run, we do not find any significant effect on the unemployment trend of the region.  
 
Robustness tests 
One concern with these estimates is the presence of externalities potentially confounding the 
selection of untreated areas. The regions neighbouring Cornwall and South Yorkshire might have 
benefitted from the improved economic and labour market conditions of Objective 1 regions, or 
they might have lost out key assets (in the form of human capital and firms) due to the 
attractiveness of EU projects. In an attempt to minimise spillover effects, the main estimations are 
replicated by excluding from the donor pool of the synthetic controls all regions which share a 
border with Cornwall or South Yorkshire 
In the case of Cornwall, the strong proximity between the Cornish and the Devon economy 
makes Devon the region most likely to be affected by treatment externalities. Similarly, all regions 
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neighbouring South Yorkshire (North Yorkshire, East Yorkshire, West Yorkshire, Lincolnshire, 
Derbyshire and Nottinghamshire) may be conditioned by the fact that the region was awarded 
Objective 1 funds. The results of the ‘leave-neighbours-out’ empirical exercise are reported in 
Appendix A6 alongside synthetic controls’ weights. Spillovers do not seem to be a major factor in 
this context as the results of these estimations are not significantly different from the ones presented 
in Figure 4
16
.  
As a second test to assess the credibility of the main synthetic control estimates, we 
artificially anticipate the start of the Objective 1 period. If, as we argue, the reduction in 
unemployment is driven by EU funds, then by anticipating the treatment we should find no 
significant difference in unemployment before 2000.  
This placebo study is performed by using 1992-1996 values of the control variables to 
construct the synthetic regions, and allow for treatment effects to materialise in 1997. The results of 
the test are displayed in Appendix A7. As shown in the two figures, there is no evidence of a 
significant divergence of unemployment trends between treated and synthetic regions before 2000. 
This is reassuring regarding the existence of any anticipation effect. The estimated effect during 
Objective 1 years seems to have little to do with labour market and economic changes occurring in 
expectation of future Objective 1 eligibility. 
 
Effect on per capita GDP 
The main intention of Cohesion Policy is to foster the economic development of European 
territories. The effectiveness of EU regional policies is generally evaluated by looking at the impact 
they produce on the economic growth rate of targeted regions. For this reason, the empirical 
analysis is extended by considering per capita GDP as an alternative outcome variable.  
In order to replicate the synthetic control analysis, we adopt a number of variables referring 
to key factors generally identified as growth determinants in the literature. The level of private 
capital investment, the stock of infrastructure, and the degree of technological development and 
innovation – regarded as key drivers of long-run regional economic growth (e.g. Sala-i-Martin, 
1996; OECD, 2009) – are proxied by: the percentage of gross fixed capital formation, the number of 
                                                          
16
 This way of controlling for externalities is imperfect. However, in absence of data on migration and mobility of firms 
across regions, it is the possible best way to control for the relocation of economic activity towards the treated regions.    
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kilometres of roads per regional area, the share of human resources in science and technology and 
the number of patent applications per thousand inhabitants, respectively. These variables are used to 
predict the synthetic control regions’ pre-treatment trends of GDP per capita. 
 
Figure 6: Per capita GDP trends, treated vs. synthetic regions 
Panel A: Cornwall Panel B: South Yorkshire 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Given that Cornwall and South Yorkshire are the regions in the sample with the lowest 
income per inhabitant, by definition the pre-treatment GDP per capita levels of treated units cannot 
be replicated by the synthetic controls. This implies that the lines of treated and counterfactual 
regions are not overlapping in the pre-treatment’s synthetic control estimates. However, as shown in 
Figure 6, both Cornwall and South Yorkshire’s trajectories run in parallel with the ones of their 
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relative synthetic counterparts before 2000, indicating that the growth rates of treatment and relative 
synthetic units are similar prior to the beginning of the Objective 1 period. 
The results of the empirical test indicate that Cornwall has partially closed the income gap 
with the synthetic control region. The bottom-left quadrant of Figure 6 illustrates that the distance 
between Cornwall and the control region is progressively reducing over time. The fastest catch-up 
of Cornwall is visible during the first treatment years.  
South Yorkshire has grown faster than its synthetic region over the analysed period. The 
top-right quadrant of Figure 6 indicates that the treated region has experienced high growth rates 
while receiving Objective 1 funds, overcoming the control region in terms of GDP per capita in 
2005. This tendency is interrupted and reverted from 2008, when South Yorkshire’s worse growth 
performance widens the income gap between treatment and control region (bottom-right quadrant, 
Figure 6). 
These results should be taken with caution, due to the imperfect method of calculating the 
synthetic controls, and to the relatively short number of pre-treatment years. Having taken these 
caveats into consideration, the findings are generally in line with the ones obtained using 
unemployment as outcome variable. Objective 1 funds seem to be effective in both regions, but 
South Yorkshire’s conditions deteriorate – relative to a similar untreated region – when the region 
loses the Objective 1 status. 
 
Ward-level analysis: difference-in-differences 
We test the robustness of the results obtained with the synthetic control method and 
unemployment as dependent variable using data at the level of wards. By taking the 134 wards of 
Cornwall and the 94 wards of South Yorkshire as treatment units, we estimate their mean 
unemployment growth during periods of highest EU financial support with a difference-in-
differences (DiD) model.  
For each of the two Objective 1 regions, the comparison groups are obtained from the 8,269 
wards of all English regions not eligible for Objective 1 funds. Rather than comparing the 134 and 
94 treated wards to all 8,269 wards from untreated regions, the analysis is limited to the wards in 
the control group which are most comparable in terms of their observable characteristics. In order to 
identify the control wards most similar to the treated wards, we resort to the propensity score 
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matching (PSM) method. The psmatch2 estimator (Leuven and Sianesi, 2003) is used to match 
wards from either Cornwall or South Yorkshire one-to-one without replacement with a set of 
untreated wards, using the nearest neighbour algorithm. The matching is based on a number of key 
socio-economic characteristics from the 1991 Census and on pre-treatment unemployment
17
. In 
such a way, we obtain a set of control wards whose ex ante probability of receiving treatment – as 
predicted by pre-treatment variables – is sufficiently similar to the one of treated units (Rosenbaum 
and Rubin, 1983). 
Table A8 in the Appendix reports the covariates’ balancing tests for wards of Cornwall and 
South Yorkshire. There is no statistical difference between treated and control wards for all 
observable socio-economic characteristics, suggesting that the PSM has produced suitable control 
groups.   
The DiD analysis is performed with panel data from 1996 to 2014. We estimate different 
versions of the following model: 
𝑈𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽 𝑂𝑏𝑗1 𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 + 𝛾 (𝑂𝑏𝑗1 𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 × 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑𝑡) + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 , 
 
where 𝑈𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡   is the annual growth rate of unemployment benefit claimants in ward i at year t; 
𝑂𝑏𝑗1 𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 is a dummy taking value one for wards belonging to treated regions (either Cornwall 
of South Yorkshire) and zero otherwise; 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑𝑡 is a dummy referring to the post-2000 period of 
reference (either the full period, 2000-2014, or one of the two sub-periods, 2000-2006 and 2007-
2014); 𝛿𝑡 are a full set of year dummies; and 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 is an idiosyncratic error term. Given that eligibility 
for EU funds is assigned at the regional (NUTS2) level, standard errors are clustered at this level 
throughout the analysis. Our DiD specification, similar to Redding and Sturm (2008), allows for 
unobserved fixed effects in wards, which are differenced out as we compute unemployment growth 
rates. The coefficient of interest of the model, 𝛾, compares the unemployment growth of treated 
wards with the one of respective groups of untreated wards, selected through PSM. 
The results of the DiD model are presented in Table 1. 
                                                          
17
 Given that almost all covariates are taken from the 1991 Census, they have no time variation. Therefore, the PSM has 
been performed with a collapsed (cross-section) dataset for the pre-treatment period. The selection of control groups has 
been done by matching one-to-one treatment wards with untreated wards on the basis of 1991 covariates and wards’ 
unemployment averaged between 1996 and 1999. For each treated ward, our matching algorithm finds a control unit with 
similar characteristics. The selection of wards as controls from the cross-section dataset has been used to compute DiD 
estimates. Hence, the sample of wards used for DiD estimates is made of treated wards (Cornwall or South Yorkshire) 
and matched wards. 
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Table 1: Difference-in-differences estimates, 1996-2014 
 
Dependent variable:  
U growth 
 
Period: 
2000-2014 2000-2006 2007-2014 2000-2014 2000-2006 2007-2014 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Cornwall wards 0.00575 0.00891 0.00574 0.00892 0.00575 0.00892    
(0.0092) (0.0092) (0.0092) (0.0092) (0.0092) (0.0092)    
Cornwall wards × period -0.0381*** -0.0439*** -0.0494*** -0.0561*** -0.0282* -0.0334**    
(0.0130) (0.0131) (0.0135) (0.0135) (0.0151) (0.0151)    
South Yorkshire wards 
      -0.00087 -0.00087 -0.00087 
      (0.0081) (0.0081) (0.0081) 
South Yorkshire wards × period 
      -0.0035 -0.0258* 0.0160 
      (0.0113) (0.0134) (0.00974) 
Year dummies ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Observations  4,787 3,923 2,659 2,179 2,932 2,385 3,382 1,880 2,065 
R-squared 0.372 0.353 0.091 0.084 0.458 0.440 0.643 0.332 0.694 
Wards 268 220 268 220 268 220 188 188 188 
Note: Clustered standard errors in parenthesis; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Sample of treated and matched wards. Cornwall’s wards not eligible for RSA in 1993-1999 excluded 
from sample in specifications (2), (4), (6). 
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We begin the discussion of the results with the estimates for Cornwall in columns (1) to (6). 
First, it can be seen that the dummy variable for Cornwall wards is insignificant in all different 
specifications, indicating no difference in unemployment growth between Cornwall and matched 
wards prior to 2000. Hence, the propensity score matching has produced comparable treatment and 
control groups on the basis of pre-treatment labour market conditions. 
The interaction term between Cornwall wards and the 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑𝑡 dummy refers to the 
difference in unemployment growth between treated and control wards during Objective 1 periods. 
According to our results, unemployment in Cornwall wards decreased 3.8 percentage points faster 
than in control wards. This is a larger difference with respect to the one obtained from synthetic 
control estimates. The estimated gap between Cornwall and the synthetic control region 
corresponds to an annual average difference in unemployment growth of 2.5 percentage points. The 
discrepancy between the two results is probably due to the fact that the pre-treatment matching in 
the ward-level analysis is performed on a lower number of covariates (for example, data on 
Structural Funds’ shares are not available at the ward level) and on a shorter time-span. For these 
reasons, the regional-level point estimates are more reliable. 
Column (3) shows that the difference in the rate of decrease of unemployment was higher 
during the first EU programming period, while in the second Objective 1 period it reduced in 
magnitude but remained marginally significant (column (5)). These trends are in line with the 
results of the synthetic control method, reporting a gap between treated and synthetic region 
developing mainly during the 2000-2006 period. 
As discussed in section III, other policy initiatives for the promotion of employment were 
implemented in Cornwall in coincidence with the Objective 1 programme. In particular, the main 
Government policy aiming at the creation of new jobs was the Regional Selective Assistance 
(RSA). Before 2000, the large majority of Cornwall’s territory was already considered eligible 
under RSA support schemes, but 48 wards of Cornwall became eligible to receive RSA transfers in 
2000. Hence, one way to partially test whether RSA policies are confounding our estimates is to 
verify whether the results are sensitive to the exclusion of these wards. Columns (2), (4) and (6) of 
Table 1 report the estimate results of the model excluding the 48 wards eligible for RSA from 2000. 
As compared to full sample estimates, the coefficients are virtually unchanged. Therefore, it seems 
plausible to assume that Cornwall’s change in unemployment can be ascribed to the success of 
employment-promoting programmes funded by Structural Funds rather than to RSA policies. 
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The results of the model for South Yorkshire are displayed in the three final columns of 
Table 1. In all specifications, the growth rate of unemployment of South Yorkshire wards is not 
significantly different from the one of control wards before 2000, again suggesting that the PSM 
based on pre-treatment covariates has allowed to create comparable treatment and control groups. 
The coefficient of the interaction term between treated wards and treatment periods in 
column (7) reports the difference in unemployment growth between South Yorkshire and control 
wards. The unemployment growth rate of South Yorkshire is not statistically different from the one 
of comparable wards. This confirms the synthetic control results in that EU policies seem to have 
produced no effect in the region over the 2000-2014 period. 
When the full period is sub-divided into two sub-periods, the results are again in line with 
those obtained with regional-level data. The negative and significant coefficient of the interaction 
term in column (8) shows that for 2000-2006 the unemployment reduction in South Yorkshire is 
significantly higher than in control wards. Conversely, for 2007-2014 the coefficient comparing the 
unemployment growth rate of South Yorkshire wards to untreated areas of England is positive 
(albeit insignificant), suggesting that unemployment has increased relative to control wards (column 
(9)).  
 
6. Regional investment strategies  
 
According to our findings, Cornwall and South Yorkshire have reduced unemployment 
significantly more than other areas in England during Objective 1 periods. In this section, we relate 
this outcome to the policies financed through EU Structural Funds and promoting employment, 
skills, social inclusion, and other key educational and labour market goals in these two regions. 
Data from the European Commission allow to reconstruct the development strategies of Cornwall 
and South Yorkshire and the proportion of allocated funds during 2000-2006 and 2007-2013. In 
such a way, it is possible to observe how Objective 1 and Phasing-in programmes have been 
designed prior to their implementation.  
The statistics on the proportion of EU funds committed by the European Commission are 
displayed in Table A9 in the Appendix. The total amounts of funds per capita are sub-divided by 
different fields of intervention. It can be noted that both Cornwall and South Yorkshire’s 2000-2006 
Objective 1 programmes have allocated a great deal of resources to direct measures for employment 
promotion and training – mainly through the European Social Fund (ESF) – in the following 
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thematic areas: ‘workforce flexibility & entrepreneurial activity’, ‘social inclusion’, ‘labour market 
policy and labour market actions for women’, and ‘educational and vocational training’18. Cornwall 
had planned to spend up to €28.7 per person every year during 2000-2006 in these themes, while 
South Yorkshire had earmarked up to €37.7 per inhabitant. Most of these interventions were 
financed by the European Social Fund (ESF). The total 2000-2006 allocations from the ESF
19
 
amounted to approximately 20 percent (Cornwall) and 29 percent (South Yorkshire) of the total 
committed EU funds.  
ESF-financed policies were not the only measures potentially contributing to reduce the 
number of people claiming unemployment benefits in the two regions. Projects focusing on 
development goals related to infrastructure, R&D and innovation, human capital, business 
development, and other investment areas, may have also produced significant employment boosts. 
Most interventions in these fields were mainly intended for the promotion of regional economic 
growth, and are likely to have contributed to the economic catch-up observed during 2000-2006.  
The main difference between the strategies of the two regions is that South Yorkshire 
concentrated large shares of funds on two themes, ‘Planning & rehabilitation’ and ‘SMEs and the 
craft sector’, while Cornwall has distributed funds more equally across different fields of 
intervention. 
In the 2007-2013 programming period, the total funds to South Yorkshire’s operational 
programme decreased by almost 70 percent. This reduction involved all investment pillars, 
including the proportion of resources directly promoting employment – calculated as the sum of 
‘lifelong learning, training, entrepreneurship’, ‘services for employment and training’, ‘social 
inclusion’, and ‘access to employment and sustainability’ – which went down to €20.2 per person, 
i.e. almost halved with respect to the previous period. In contrast, Cornwall’s effort to create new 
jobs and reduce labour market exclusion increased to €55 per person annually, 35 percent of the 
total committed funds. Yet, this investment was only partially successful given that, as shown by 
                                                          
18
 These initiatives were included within the strategic goal ‘Developing people’ of the Single Programming Document 
(SPD) for Cornwall (South West Observatory Skills and Learning, 2008), and the priority theme ‘Building a learning 
region which promotes equity, employment and social inclusion’ of the SPD for South Yorkshire (Government Office for 
Yorkshire and The Humber, 2008). 
19
 The total ESF allocations for 2000-2006 were €101m for Cornwall (total EU funds in the region: €520m), and €365m 
for South Yorkshire (total EU funds in the region: €1,212m). 
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our results, the rate of unemployment reduction during 2007-2013 was lower with respect to 2000-
2006
20
.  
 
 
7. Conclusions 
 
The exit of the United Kingdom from the European Union will leave poorer UK regions 
without access to EU Structural Funds. This paper has focused on two regions that voted to leave 
the EU in the Brexit referendum, despite having benefitted from EU Cohesion Policy for many 
years. The analysis has tested whether the most significant form of EU economic support – the 
Objective 1 programme – has been successful, and the extent to which a reduction of EU subsidies 
may affect the development trajectories of UK regions. Cornwall and South Yorkshire have been 
compared to synthetic control regions similar to them but not eligible for Objective 1 policies.  
The results indicate that Cornwall has made good use of Objective 1 funds. EU development 
policies have helped to lower the proportion of people claiming unemployment benefits and reduce 
the income gap with richer regions. South Yorkshire received Objective 1 funds for one single 
programming period, during which some significant improvements were visible. As compared to 
regions not eligible for Objective 1 support, South Yorkshire has grown faster and has seen 
unemployment diminish. However, these gains have not led to a different and self-sustainable 
development path. During the following period the region displayed one of the worst performances 
among English regions, despite still being subsidised by the EU as part of the Phasing-in 
programme.  
These findings should foster a careful reflection over the future of poorer UK regions in the 
event of an imminent exit of the country from the EU. Losing the possibility to access EU Structural 
Funds is likely to expose the economy of less developed UK regions to potential adverse effects. A 
region like Cornwall, which has benefitted from Objective 1 policies for a long period of time, faces 
the highest risks. In this sense, the experience of South Yorkshire may represent a valuable lesson; 
losing Objective 1 funds can produce a short-term shock, and the labour market and economy can 
continue to struggle in the medium-term. Cornwall is not necessarily bound to follow the same 
                                                          
20
  The calculation of investment shares was obtained from commitment data. As such, they correspond to potential 
disbursement of funds, planned in accordance with the European Commission before the beginning of the programming 
periods. Hence, the shares of investments in Table A9 might not reflect the finances actually received and spent by the 
regions. 
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destiny as South Yorkshire as the two regions differ in many respects, including the investment 
strategies adopted during Objective 1 periods. These differences, however, may not be sufficient for 
Cornwall to take a different post-policy development path. Unlike EU regions shifting from a status 
of ‘Objective 1’ to ‘Phasing-out’ or ‘Phasing-in’, Cornwall will not have the possibility of obtaining 
EU transitional funding. Hence, the loss of EU subsidies may be more likely to produce negative 
consequences on its economy if the UK national Government does not put in place any 
compensatory policy supporting its transition in funding environment. Even if substitute regional 
policies were to be introduced, agreeing their contours would be far from simple and Cornwall 
might temporarily be left without external support should the negotiations last too long (Bachtler 
and Begg, 2016). These potential repercussions apply not only to Cornwall but also to all 
economically disadvantaged regions dependent on EU aid, such as West Wales and The Valleys, 
the only other UK Objective 1 region at the time of the Brexit vote.  
More generally, the results of the analysis contribute to the current debate on the 
effectiveness of EU Cohesion Policy. The Cornwall case has shown that Objective 1 funding may 
be successful, even in a causal sense. However, the effects produced by these policies may not be 
long-lasting, rather they may disappear when the funding period has ended. Hence, when designing 
and implementing development projects, EU Objective 1 regions should think carefully about what 
the legacy of the interventions will be. EU funds should be used to prepare the less advantaged 
territories for the moment when, inevitably, the resources will be cut down. Not doing so may imply 
that any improvement obtained during the Objective 1 period will vanish in the long term.  
The present work is the first in the literature to empirically study the impact of a sudden 
increase and decrease in the availability of Structural Funds on the performance of less developed 
regions. The results of the analysis should be taken with caution, mostly because the investigation is 
based on two specific contexts. An important task for future contributions is to test the validity of 
our findings in other regions, assessing whether they evolve in similar ways as in the two case-
studies analysed in this paper. In addition, the data at our disposal do not allow us to provide clear 
answers regarding the key mechanisms producing the observed effects. Future research may attempt 
to identify the factors conditioning the long-term impacts of EU policies using different 
identification strategies.  
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Annex 
 
Synthetic Control Method 
The Synthetic Control Method for comparative case studies (Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2003; 
Abadie et al., 2010; 2015) allows to assess the effect of policy interventions taking place at an 
aggregate level, using data for geographical units not exposed to the treatment but comparable to 
the treated region. The sample is made of  𝐽 + 1 units (NUTS2 regions), with 𝑗 = 1 being the case 
of interest and 𝑗 = 2 to 𝑗 = 𝐽 + 1 being potential comparisons. To construct the synthetic control 
we consider all English NUTS2 regions not receiving Objective 1 funds during 2000-2013, using 
data from pre-intervention years. The control unit is obtained from a (𝐽 × 1) vector 𝑾 =
(𝑤2, … , 𝑤𝐽+1)′  made of nonnegative weights all summing up to one. Each value of 𝑾 represents a 
weighted average of values obtained from control regions, that is, a potential synthetic control. Let 
𝑿𝟏 be a (𝑘 × 1) vector of pre-treatment characteristics that can be used as predictors of labour 
market outcomes, and 𝑽 a (𝑘 × 𝑘) diagonal matrix whose values indicate the relative importance of 
each predictor. We look for a vector 𝑾∗ that minimises (𝑿𝟏 − 𝑿𝟎𝑾)′𝑽(𝑿𝟏 − 𝑿𝟎𝑾), subject to 
𝑤𝑗 ≥ 0 (𝑗 = 2, … , 𝐽)  and 𝑤2 + ⋯ + 𝑤𝐽+1 = 1. 𝑽 is chosen such that the treated regions’ trajectory 
in the pre-treatment period is best reproduced by the synthetic region.  
Let 𝑌𝑗𝑡 be the outcome of region 𝑗 at time 𝑡, 𝒀𝟏 a (𝑇1 × 1) vector collecting post-intervention values 
of the outcome variable and 𝒀𝟎 a (𝑇1 × 𝐽) matrix containing post-intervention values of the 
outcome for the control region. The synthetic control estimator of the treatment effect on the treated 
region is given by the comparison of the different outcomes of the two regions from the beginning 
of the Objective 1 programme until the end of the period. The synthetic control estimator is 
obtained as: 𝒀𝟏𝑡 − ∑ 𝑤𝑗
∗𝐽+1
𝑗=2 𝑌𝑗𝑡.  
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Appendix 
 
A1 Annual Euros of Structural Funds per inhabitant in English regions by EU programming 
period 
Region 1994-1999 Region 2000-2006 Region 2007-2013
a 
Merseyside*  61.9 Cornwall & Isles of Scilly* 138.0 Cornwall & Isles of Scilly* 144.6 
Tees Valley & Durham 32.1 Merseyside* 137.3 Merseyside 39.4 
Greater Manchester
 28.7 South Yorkshire* 126.8 South Yorkshire 34.3 
South Yorkshire 27.5 Tees Valley & Durham 54.2 Tees Valley & Durham 22.3 
Northumberland & Tyne & Wear 27.0 Northumberland & Tyne & Wear 52.3 Northumberland & Tyne & Wear 22.3 
Cornwall & Isles of Scilly 26.8 West Midlands 45.4 Greater Manchester 14.9 
West Midlands 26.5 Greater Manchester 44.0 Cumbria 14.2 
Cumbria 24.3 
East Yorkshire & Northern 
Lincolnshire 
40.5 
East Yorkshire & Northern 
Lincolnshire 
13.6 
East Yorkshire & Northern 
Lincolnshire 
23.5 Cumbria 36.3 North Yorkshire 13.5 
Derbyshire & Nottinghamshire 17.1 Devon 36.3 Lancashire 13.3 
Devon 16.1 Lincolnshire 35.5 West Yorkshire 12.8 
Shropshire & Staffordshire 14.5 Shropshire & Staffordshire 32.3 Cheshire 12.6 
West Yorkshire 10.1 Lancashire 31.0 Derbyshire & Nottinghamshire 12.6 
Lancashire 9.1 West Yorkshire 30.9 Lincolnshire 12.4 
North Yorkshire 8.6 Derbyshire & Nottinghamshire 30.0 
Leicestershire, Rutland & 
Northamptonshire 
11.6 
Lincolnshire 7.7 North Yorkshire 26.4 Shropshire & Staffordshire 11.4 
Herefordshire, Worcestershire & 
Warwickshire  
7.1 Inner London 22.2 
Herefordshire, Worcestershire & 
Warwickshire 
11.3 
Inner London 5.3 East Anglia 21.1 West Midlands 11.2 
Kent 3.8 
Herefordshire, Worcestershire & 
Warwickshire 
20.5 Devon 10.3 
East Anglia 3.5 Cheshire 18.3 Essex 9.6 
Cheshire  3.3 Kent 17.6 Dorset & Somerset 9.2 
Outer London 1.9 Outer London 16.6 East Anglia 8.9 
Essex 1.5 Bedfordshire & Hertfordshire 16.4 Outer London 8.1 
Gloucestershire, Wiltshire & 
Bristol/Bath area 
1.4 
Leicestershire, Rutland & 
Northamptonshire 
16.0 Inner London 7.8 
Dorset & Somerset 1.4 
Gloucestershire, Wiltshire & 
Bristol/Bath area 
15.5 Kent 7.7 
Hampshire & Isle of Wight 1.3 Essex 15.3 Hampshire & Isle of Wight 7.7 
Leicestershire, Rutland & 
Northamptonshire 
1.2 Dorset & Somerset 15.0 
Gloucestershire, Wiltshire & 
Bristol/Bath area 
7.7 
Bedfordshire & Hertfordshire 1.1 Surrey, East & West Sussex 14.4 Surrey, East & West Sussex 7.3 
Surrey, East & West Sussex 0.9 Hampshire & Isle of Wight 13.9 Bedfordshire & Hertfordshire 6.8 
Berkshire, Buckinghamshire & 
Oxfordshire 
0.8 
Berkshire, Buckinghamshire & 
Oxfordshire 
13.6 
Berkshire, Buckinghamshire & 
Oxfordshire 
5.6 
Notes: values are calculated as Structural Funds’ payments from the European Commission divided by regional population. Source: 
DG Regional Policy. * Objective 1 regions; a / provisional figures. 
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A2 UK rates of unemployment and unemployment benefit claimants 
 
  
 
Source: Nomis. 
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A3 Descriptive statistics – wards 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. 
Ward residents in 1991 8519 5267 3779 
Unemployment (1996-2014) 161,240 1.871 1.555 
Unemployment growth (1996-2014) 152,260 0.0056 0.401 
Unemployment growth (1996-1999) 25,537 -0.177 0.204 
Unemployment growth (2000-2014) 126,723 0.0424 0.420 
Unemployment growth (2000-2006) 59,095 -0.0181 0.329 
Unemployment growth (2007-2014) 67,628 0.0954 0.480 
Variables used for PSM:     
Unemployment (1996-1999 average)
a
 8518 2.689 1.857 
1991 Census:    
Employed people in agriculture, forestry and fishing
a
 8519 3.357 2.822 
Employed people in mining
a
 8519 2.478 1.422 
Employed people in manufacturing
a
  8519 15.50 3.663 
Employed people in construction
a
 8519 6.817 1.455 
Employed people in distribution and catering
a
  8519 18.71 2.609 
Employed people in transportation
a
 8519 5.436 1.630 
Employed people in banking and finance
a
 8519 10.78 3.336 
Employed people in other services
a
 8519 25.11 4.402 
Self-employed workers
a
 8519 7.301 3.570 
Full-time workers
a 8519 72.81 10.09 
Female employment
a
 8519 10.24 1.469 
Inactive population
b
 8519 32.80 5.996 
People whose ethnic group is white
b
 8519 96.15 8.473 
Migrants (within/between wards or from outside UK)
b
 8519 10.19 4.022 
Students
b
 8519 3.102 1.417 
Note: a / percentage of economically active population; b / percentage of residents. 
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A4 Pre-treatment characteristics: Cornwall, synthetic Cornwall, South Yorkshire, Synthetic 
South Yorkshire and England (1992-1999) 
Variable Source 
Pre-treatment averages 
Cornwall 
Synthetic 
Cornwall 
England
e South 
Yorkshire 
Synthetic  
South 
Yorkshire 
England
f 
Euros of Structural Funds per capita
a DG Regio 26.74 20.62 11.08 28.69 25.92 11.08 
Per capita GDP
a
 OECD 10,980 15,665 18,054 13,840 19,640 18,155 
Population in employment
b LFS LAD 53.23 53.77 58.57 52.20 53.69 58.51 
Economically inactive population
c
 LFS LAD 41.14 40.32 36.51 41.04 39.73 36.53 
Female employment
b
 LFS LAD 21.33 22.75 23.73 22.24 22.61 23.77 
Full-time workers
c
 LFS LAD 52.35 52.92 56.72 49.47 51.58 56.61 
Self-employed workers
b
 LFS LAD 11.64 7.54 7.64 5.17 5.41 7.42 
Long-term unemployment as percentage of 
unemployment
a
 
Eurostat 26.18 27.07 25.13 29.98 35.41 25.27 
Sectorial shares (percentage)        
Agriculture & Mining
a
 Eurostat 6.28 3.07 2.39 0.6 0.88 2.19 
Manufacturing
a
 Eurostat 11.63 16.48 16.59 18.95 18.48 16.85 
Construction
 a
 Eurostat 5.41 4.87 4.64 5.61 4.83 4.64 
Wholesale & retail trade
a
 Eurostat 25.80 25.34 25.90 27.33 25.66 25.95 
Financial & insurance activities
a
 Eurostat 9.68 11.97 14.25 11.78 12.50 14.33 
Real Estate; scientific activities; public 
administration and defense; education
a
 
Eurostat 31.37 33.62 30.11 30.68 31.06 30.08 
Education and training        
16-19 year old in full-time education
b
 LFS LAD 3.37 3.16 3.33 2.73 2.92 3.31 
Working age population with NVQ 3 or above
d LFS LAD 33.88 33.97 36.37 31.45 33.42 36.35 
Working age population receiving job related 
training
b LFS LAD 10.64 11.79 12.14 12.62 12.36 12.20 
Note: Sectorial shares and LSF LAD variables are calculated as percentage of working age population. a / average for 1995-1999; b / 
average for 1992-1999; c / average for 1993-1999; d / average for 1994-1999; e / average for all English regions excluding 
Merseyside and South Yorkshire; f / average for all English regions excluding Merseyside and Cornwall. 
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A5 Synthetic control method, regional weights in the synthetic Cornwall and South Yorkshire 
Region 
Synthetic Cornwall Synthetic South Yorkshire 
Weight Weight 
Tees Valley & Durham 0.088 0.365 
Northumberland  0.125 0.100 
Cumbria 0 0 
Cheshire  0 0 
Greater Manchester 0 0.156 
Lancashire 0 0 
East Yorkshire 0 0.251 
North Yorkshire 0 0 
West Yorkshire 0 0 
Derbyshire & Nottinghamshire 0 0 
Leicestershire, Rutland & 
Northamptonshire 
0 0 
Lincolnshire 0 0 
Herefordshire Worcestershire  0 0 
Shropshire & Staffordshire 0 0 
West Midlands 0.212 0 
East Anglia 0 0 
Bedfordshire & Hertfordshire 0 0 
Essex 0 0 
Inner London 0 0.128 
Outer London 0 0 
Berkshire, Buckinghamshire & 
Oxfordshire 
0 0 
Surrey East & West Sussex 0 0 
Hampshire & Isle of Wight 0 0 
Kent 0 0 
Gloucestershire, Wiltshire & Bristol/Bath 
area 
0 0 
Dorset & Somerset 0 0 
Devon 0.575 0 
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A6  Synthetic control method, robustness test: ‘leave-neighbours-out’ 
Cornwall vs. synthetic Cornwall, excluding Devon 
 
Region 
Synthetic 
Cornwall 
Weight 
Tees Valley & Durham 0 
Northumberland  0.052 
Cumbria 0.305 
Cheshire  0 
Greater Manchester 0 
Lancashire 0 
East Yorkshire 0 
North Yorkshire 0 
West Yorkshire 0 
Derbyshire & Nottinghamshire 0 
Leicestershire, Rutland & Northamptonshire 0 
Lincolnshire 0 
Herefordshire, Worcestershire & 
Warwickshire  
0 
Shropshire & Staffordshire 0 
West Midlands 0.485 
East Anglia 0 
Bedfordshire &Hertfordshire 0 
Essex 0 
Inner London 0 
Outer London 0 
Berkshire, Buckinghamshire & Oxfordshire 0 
Surrey East & West Sussex 0 
Hampshire & Isle of Wight 0 
Kent 0 
Gloucestershire, Wiltshire & Bristol/Bath 
area 
0 
Dorset and Somerset 0.159 
 
 
South Yorkshire vs. synthetic South Yorkshire, excluding regions neighbouring SY 
 
Region 
Synthetic 
SY 
Weight 
Tees Valley & Durham 0.434 
Northumberland  0.026 
Cumbria 0.124 
Cheshire  0 
Greater Manchester 0.237 
Lancashire 0 
Leicestershire, Rutland & 
Northamptonshire 
0 
Herefordshire, Worcestershire & 
Warwickshire  
0 
Shropshire & Staffordshire 0 
West Midlands 0 
East Anglia 0 
Bedfordshire &Hertfordshire 0 
Essex 0 
Inner London 0.179 
Outer London 0 
Berkshire, Buckinghamshire & Oxfordshire 0 
Surrey East & West Sussex 0 
Hampshire & Isle of Wight 0 
Kent 0 
Gloucestershire, Wiltshire & Bristol/Bath 
area 
0 
Dorset and Somerset 0 
Devon 0 
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A7 Synthetic control method, robustness test: placebo treatment 
Panel A: Cornwall Panel B: South Yorkshire 
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A8 Balancing tests, propensity score matching 
 Cornwall South Yorkshire 
  Mean t-test Mean t-test 
Variable 
Treated 
(Cornwall) 
Control 
(matched) 
t     p>t 
Treated  
(South Yorkshire) 
Control 
(matched) 
t    p>t 
Unemployment (1996-1999) 3.72 3.72 0.00 0.998 4.24 4.46 -0.75 0.453 
1991 variables: 
        
Employed people in agriculture, forestry 
and fishing
a
 
7.40 6.81 0.62 0.536 0.55 0.59 -0.3 0.768 
Employed people in mining
a
 2.16 2.43 -0.64 0.521 4.77 5.08 -0.52 0.606 
Employed people in manufacturing
a
  8.67 8.39 0.6 0.550 15.62 15.05 0.88 0.379 
Employed people in construction
a
 8.62 8.20 1.03 0.302 7.20 7.02 0.59 0.559 
Employed people in distribution and 
catering
a
  
21.79 22.54 -0.84 0.404 18.48 17.93 0.91 0.363 
Employed people in transportation
a
 4.45 3.93 1.47 0.142 5.82 5.45 0.9 0.369 
Employed people in banking and 
finance
a
 
6.78 6.60 0.49 0.626 4.57 4.75 -0.73 0.469 
Employed people in other services
a
 26.44 26.78 -0.36 0.723 22.70 22.84 -0.13 0.896 
Self-employed workers
a
 11.25 10.94 0.51 0.607 4.09 3.98 0.43 0.669 
Full-time workers
a
 57.91 57.57 0.27 0.786 50.87 51.63 -0.73 0.466 
Female employment
a
 21.38 21.39 -0.03 0.979 21.01 21.20 -0.93 0.356 
Inactive population
b
 38.38 38.93 -0.66 0.511 35.39 35.64 -0.35 0.724 
People whose ethnic group is white
b
 99.49 99.44 1.19 0.237 97.22 98.01 -1.13 0.261 
Migrants (within/between wards or from 
outside UK)
b
 
10.39 10.93 -1.18 0.238 9.02 9.96 -1.76 0.081 
Students
b
 3.17 3.11 0.29 0.768 2.73 2.53 0.82 0.411 
no of wards 134 134     94 94     
Note: a / percentage of economically active population; b / percentage of residents. 
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A9 Committed EU funds by field of intervention in Cornwall and South Yorkshire, 2000-2006 & 2007-2013 
Field of Intervention 
Annual euros per capita 
Field of Intervention 
Annual euros per capita 
Cornwall 
South 
Yorkshire 
Cornwall 
South 
Yorkshire 
2000-2006     2007-2013    
1. Transport Infrastructure 7.2 9.6 1. Transport infrastructure 8.2 1.1 
2. Telecommunication, energy & environment infrastructure 21.5 8.8 2. Telecommunication, energy & environment infrastructure 34.6 6.2 
3. Social Infrastructure 1.1 2.1 3. Social infrastructure 0.1 - 
4. Research, technological development & innovation 10.0 5.6 4. Research, technological development & innovation 37.8 11.4 
5. Tourism & culture 6.3 - 5. Tourism & culture 1.5 0.1 
6. Planning & rehabilitation 6.4 35.5 6. Urban & rural regeneration 3.3 4.4 
7. Large business organisations 19.3 3.4 7. Investment in firms 14.1 6.0 
8. SMEs & the craft sector 13.8 26.4 8. Lifelong learning, training & entrepreneurship 18.7 7.7 
9. Workforce flexibility & entrepreneurial activity 13.8 10.3 9. Services for employment & training 1.8 0.4 
10. Social inclusion 4.9 5.1 10. Social inclusion 14.4 4.5 
11. Labour market policy & labour market actions for women 5.9 10.9 11. Access to employment & sustainability 20.3 6.7 
12. Educational & vocational training 4.2 11.3 12. Human capital 1.7 0.1 
13. Agriculture, forestry, fisheries, development of rural areas 25.0 - 13. Institutional capacity 0.1 0.1 
Total 139.3 129.0 Total 156.4 48.5 
Note: values are calculated from European Commission’s committed allocations of EU funds by axis, divided by regional population. Source: DG Regional Policy.
 
